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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20000738-CA

NATASHA HAWLEY,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of driving
under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, and one
count of leaving the scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly interpret rule 29 of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it refused to consider the
merits of defendant's untimely motion to disqualify the judge?
2.

Where the governing statute plainly directs that a

defendant's urefus[al] to submit to a chemical test . . . is
admissible in any . . . criminal action," did the trial court err
in admitting defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test?
The trial court's interpretation of a statute or rule

presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness.

Rushton v.

Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
3.

Where the State produced proof that defendant had twice

been convicted of alcohol-related offenses in Utah, did the
evidence suffice to sustain her driving under the influence
conviction as a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44?
An appellate court "will reverse a criminal conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so inconclusive
or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(citation

omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(8), governing implied consent to
chemical tests for alcohol or drugs, provides:
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to
submit to a chemical test or tests or any
additional test under this section, evidence
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed while the
person was operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(8)(Supp. 2000).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a minor vehicle collision, defendant was charged
with driving under the influence, a third degree felony, and
leaving the scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2).
Two-and-a-half months later, defendant, a practicing attorney,
filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, before whom she
regularly appeared (R. 20). After certification to another judge
for determination pursuant to rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, defendant's motion was denied as untimely filed (R.
26, 31-32).
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for
trial (R. 41). She then filed several motions to suppress, all
of which were denied (R. 44-45, 53-54, 55) . Following a trial by
jury, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 103). The court
sentenced her to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison on
the alcohol charge and six months in the Grand County Jail for
leaving the scene of an accident.

The court stayed the prison

sentence, ordering that defendant be released directly to an
inpatient alcohol treatment program after serving her jail time
and that she serve 3 6 months on probation with Adult Probation
and Parole. Additionally, the court imposed $1850 in fines and
suspended defendant's license to practice law for twelve months
(R. 117-20).

This timely appeal followed (R. 126).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On a January night in 2 000, defendant, driving to her
boyfriend's house, stopped at a Maverick station to purchase two
six-packs of Zima1 (R. 133: 62, 89-90).

Following her purchase,

she backed out of her parking space and ran into a truck parked
at the gas pumps (Id. at 50, 90). Defendant exited her vehicle
to talk to the driver of the truck.

She told the driver she had

insurance and would take care of any damage (Id. at 52, 91).2
At this juncture, the testimony of defendant and the driver
of the truck differ.

The driver, Kristina Jim, testified that

she asked defendant for her insurance information.

Jim handed

defendant a piece of paper on which to write, but defendant's
handwriting was illegible (Id. at 53). Consequently, Jim asked
defendant if she had something in printed form.

Defendant

responded that she had left her driver's license and insurance
card at home (Id. at 53, 57). Jim then wrote down defendant's
license plate number and told defendant she was going inside to
report the accident to the police (Id. at 53-54) . After entering
the store, Jim turned around and looked back towards the parking
area.

Defendant's vehicle was gone (Id. at 55).

Jim described defendant as "having a hard time standing,"

1

Zima, according to its manufacturer, is a "lightly
carbonated alcohol beverage" containing 4.8% alcohol by volume.
See www.coors.com/brews/zima.asp.
2

Damage to the truck amounted to $901.95 (R. 133: 56).
4

"holding onto the vehicle," and "wreathing [sic] the smell of
alcohol" (Id. at 54-55) .

The Maverick clerk also testified that!

when defendant had made her purchase, he had smelled alcohol on
her breath (Id. at 63).
According to defendant, when Jim requested her insurance
documentation, defendant went to her vehicle to look for it (Id.
at 91). When she finished looking, however, Jim was gone (Id.
92).

According to defendant, she looked unsuccessfully for Jim,

both inside and outside the Maverick store.

And although

defendant noticed a pay phone in the Maverick parking lot, she
instead drove to her boyfriend's home, about a mile away, to call
the Sheriff's Office and report the accident (Id.).
Defendant flatly denied that she was under the influence o$
alcohol at the time of the accident (Id.).

Rather, she testified

that she drove to her boyfriend's house, where she parked her
car.

Then, "upset" and "shaky" about the accident, she "pulled

out a bottle of vodka and took several drinks out of it . . . t0
calm down" (Id. at 92-93).

She then went inside and called the

sheriff (Id^ at 93).
The Grand County Sheriff's Office received two calls about
the accident, the first one from the Maverick store and the
second, somewhat later, from defendant (Id. at 73). A Sheriff's
deputy responded to the Maverick store, where he met with Jim
(Id. at 73-74).

When the second call came in to the dispatcher,

5

the deputy asked that defendant be directed back to the scene.
Defendant, however, responded to the dispatcher that she had
already parked her car and was out of the vehicle (Id. at 74).
Accordingly, the deputy, followed by Jim, drove to defendant's
boyfriend's house to meet defendant

(Id.).

Observed by the deputy, defendant came out of her
boyfriend's house with her insurance card (Id. at 75). The
deputy testified that "she was a little unsteady on her feet"
and, when she came through the front gate, "seemed to have a
difficulty in closing [it]."

(Id.).

He further testified that he

"could smell a very strong odor of alcohol comin' from her"
(Id.).

The deputy asked her if she'd had anything to drink.

said she'd "'had a couple'" (Id.).
anything to drink since

the

She

He then asked "if she'd had

accident"

(Id.)(emphasis added).

She

told him that she had not (Id. at 75, 99).
Again, defendant provided a different version of what
happened.

According to her, she told the dispatcher that she did

not want to return to the Maverick store because she knew she had
been drinking and, therefore, did not want to drive (Id. at 94).
And, she said, when the deputy later asked her if she had had
anything to drink, she responded, "'Yes, I've had a couple or two
or three'" (Id. at 95). But, she testified, "then he asked me if
I'd had anything to drink since
no"

reporting

(Id.)(emphasis added).

6

the

accident

and I said

Based on his observations, the deputy engaged defendant in
three field sobriety tests, all of which she was unable to
successfully complete (Id. at 77-79).

Concluding that defendant

was too drunk to operate a motor vehicle, the deputy arrested her
(Id. at 80-81).

After being transported to the Sheriff's Office,

defendant refused to take a chemical breath test because, she
testified, she knew she had been drinking (Id. at 80).
Nonetheless, she maintained that she had not been drinking before
the accident, and that her alcohol consumption had occurred only
after the accident, in the interim between parking her car at her
boyfriend's house and telephoning the Sheriff's office to report
the accident (Id. at 96) .
Presented with this evidence, the jury deliberated for
forty-five minutes and convicted defendant as charged (Id. at
106) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted
her motion to disqualify the judge because her service as an
officer of the court created an appearance of bias.
argument fails on two grounds.

This

First, the reviewing court acted

properly in denying the motion without considering its merits
because the motion was filed almost two months late, and the
governing statute plainly accords the court the discretion to
dismiss untimely filed motions to disqualify.

7

Second, even if

the argument were to be considered under the rubric of plain
error or exceptional circumstances or ineffective assistance of
counsel, as defendant urges, it would fail because defendant has
not carried her burden of demonstrating that the substitution of
another judge would likely have made a difference to the outcome
of her trial.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
admitting testimony that she refused to take a chemical breath
test.

This argument fails because the plain statutory language

is explicit that such a refusal is admissible.

Further, even if

the trial court had erred, the error would necessarily have been
harmless because the evidence was cumulative of what even
defendant conceded - that she had been drinking.

The only

question, which the breath test would not have answered, was
whether defendant's alcohol consumption occurred before or after
the accident.
Finally, defendant argues that the evidence of two prior
alcohol-related convictions was insufficient to support the
enhancement of the present offense from a misdemeanor to a third
degree felony.

Where the State produced two written, clear,

signed judgments, however, the judgments enjoy a presumption of
regularity and validity.

The burden then shifted to defendant to

produce evidence of their fatal flaws.
do so, her argument fails.

8

Where defendant failed to

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY THE ASSIGNED JUDGE WAS
UNTIMELY FILED, THE REVIEWING JUDGE
PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER IT;
EVEN IF THE CLAIM IS RAISED AS
PLAIN ERROR, EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, OR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE, IT ULTIMATELY FAILS FOR
LACK OF PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
Defendant argues that the assigned judge should have recused
himself because defendant was an attorney who regularly practiced
before him.

Her service as an officer of the court, asserts

defendant, "at a minimum constituted a circumstance from which
[the trial court's] impartiality was reasonably subject to
question [sic]."

Br. of App. at 23.

In essence, then, defendant

seems to be arguing that the assigned judge's handling of her
case created at least the appearance of bias.
The reviewing judge properly declined to reach this issue.
Defendant was charged on January 28, 2000 (R. 1-2). On April 11+,
defendant filed a motion to disqualify the judge, accompanied by
an affidavit of prejudice (R. 20-24) . On April 18, pursuant to
rule, the assigned judge certified the motion to another judge
for determination (R. 26). See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c).

The

reviewing judge did not reach the merits, but rather denied the
motion because it was untimely (R. 31-32).

The reviewing judge

also found that because defendant had known all of the

9

circumstances giving rise to her motion from the outset of the
case, the motion was filed for purposes of delay (Id.).3
Consequently, the case was referred back to the original judge.4
The reviewing court's ruling was correct as a matter of law.
Rule 2 9 provides that:
The motion shall
be filed
after commencement
of the action, but not later
than 20 days
after the last of the following:
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to
the judge;
(ii) appearance of the party or the
party's attorney; or
(iii) the date on which the moving party
learns or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the grounds
upon which the motion is based.
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (1) (B) (emphasis added) .

The rule also

clearly grants the judge discretion to dismiss an untimely
motion.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (3) (C) ("The reviewing judge

3

Defendant takes issue with this assertion of delay. See
Br. of App. at 26. The clear untimeliness of the motion,
however, is dispositive of her claim. That is, the rule requires
reassignment of a case only if all three criteria of the rule are
met. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3)(A)(reviewing judge must assign
the case to another judge only if "the reviewing judge finds that
the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith,
and legally sufficient"(emphasis added)). Because the motion was
plainly untimely and could be denied on that ground alone,
whether it was filed in good faith or for purposes of delay need
not even be considered at this juncture.
4

Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails. It is
undisputed that both the assigned and reviewing judges fulfilled
the requirements of rule 29. Consequently, absent a showing of
actual bias or abuse of discretion, the assigned judge's failure
to recuse himself cannot constitute reversible error. See State
v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah 1988).
10
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Defendant also urges this Court to reach his claim on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, or
exceptional circumstances.
theories fail.

See Br. of App. at 26-29.

All three

First, the ineffectiveness claim fails because

"[c]ounsel's failure to bring motions that would have been futile
does not equal ineffective assistance."

State v. Lopez, 1999 UT

fl (citing Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994));
accord State v. Rivas, 2000 UT App 9 %1.

Here, even had counsel

timely filed a motion to disqualify the judge, that conduct would
have been futile because the law does not require recusal under
the factual circumstances of this case.

See Neeley, 748 P.2d at

1094-95 (failure to recuse not reversible error where defendant
does not demonstrate actual bias or abuse of discretion).
Second, the plain error claim fails because defendant has
not shown that the law was clear at the time of trial.

State v.

Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) (stating "error is not
plain where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court").

That is, defendant asserts that it should have been

obvious to the assigned judge that he should not hear a case in
which an attorney practicing before him was the defendant.
However, where no established appellate law supports this
proposition, the alleged error could not have been obvious to the
court.
Third, the exceptional circumstance doctrine, which applies
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POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE A
CHEMICAL BREATH TEST; EVEN HAD THE
COURT ERRED, THE ERROR WOULD LIKELY
HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THE
OUTCOME OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
Section 41-6-44.10(8), governing admissibility of chemical
tests for alcohol or drugs, provides:
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to
submit to a chemical test or tests or any
additional test under this section, evidence
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed while the
person was operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (Supp. 2000).
Despite plain statutory language, defendant argues that the
court erred in admitting testimony that she had refused to take a
chemical breath test.

See Br. of App. at 36. On appeal,

defendant's argument turns on the phrase "under this section,"
which she assumes modifies not the preceding phrase "or any
additional test," but rather implicates all the requirements
provided for in the entire statute governing driving under the
influence.

For this sweeping interpretation, defendant cites

several statutory construction cases that require courts to
evaluate statutes "as a whole, and in the context of their
operation" (Br. of App. at 35).
Specifically, however, after defendant's brief quotes the
14
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In the trial court, defendant contended that a refusal to
take a breath test would b e admissible only if the driver's
license d i v i s i o n , pursuant to a n unspecified subsection of
section 41-6-44.10'., h a d entered a finding of fact at an
administrative license revocation hearing attesting to
defendant's refusal to take the b r e a t h test (R. 4 4 - 4 5 ) , Becai ise
the driver's license division d i d not make such a finding,
defendant asserted that her refusal w a s not admissible under
section 41-6-44.10 (Id,) ... T h e trial court considered and
rejected this argument, stating that "evidence of a n y refusal, i s
'admissible, regardless of what the administrative determination
w a s " (R. 1,33 i 38) .
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statutory language is the first source of statutory
interpretation); Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1989)(where statutory language is plain, appellate courts will
look no further).
And, in any event, defendant's refusal to take the breath
test did nothing to alter the evidentiary picture one way or the
other.

The evidence was undisputed that defendant had been

drinking.

The clerk at the Maverick store testified that he

smelled alcohol on defendant's breath at the time he sold her two
six-packs of Zima (R. 63). The driver of the vehicle struck by
defendant's car testified that defendant smelled strongly of
alcohol and was having a difficult time maintaining her balance,
leaning on the vehicle to stay upright (R. 54-55).

And the

responding law enforcement officer also testified that defendant
smelled of alcohol, was a little unsteady on her feet, and failed
all three field sobriety tests that she was asked to perform (R.
75, 77-79).

Indeed, defendant herself admitted that she had been

drinking prior to the time that the officer asked her to take the
breath test (R. 93) .7 Thus, it was undisputed that defendant had
been drinking.

The only question, which a breath test would not

have answered, was whether her alcohol consumption occurred

7

Defendant also admitted that she had refused to take the
test, offering two explanations for her actions -- that she knew
she had been drinking and that, at the time, she was scared (R.
96-97) .
16
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POINT THREE
THE E V I D E N C E OP1 T W O OF DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR ALCOHOL-RELATED CONVICTIONS
SUFFICED TO TRIGGER SECTION 41-644(6)(a) AND INCREASE THE CHARGE OF
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE FROM A
MISDEMEANOR TO A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY
Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-44 providti rhat a statutory v nation
"within six years of t"

- ^ore prior •: nvictions ...uder

s ec t i on" r e 1: 1 ie 1: s 11: 1 e
§ 41-6-44 (6) (a) (1999)
insi 3 ffici e" '"

D e f e n d a n t contends that the -tar-r adduced

'

felony status : : *~:;e urrent offense,

» , - 1 « « J ie
^ee 3r

JI Ape, at

41-42.

The State presented certified documentation of four prior
alcohol-related actions against defendant (R. 134: 4-5).

One

documented a plea in abeyance for alcohol-related reckless
driving.

See Def. Ex. #3.

The trial court correctly concluded,

however, that the plea did not amount to a '"conviction" and could
not, therefore, serve as a basis for classifying the current
offense as a felony.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l)(providing

that trial court does not enter a conviction when a plea in
abeyance entered accepted); accord State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d
415, 416 (Utah App. 1997) (appeal taken from order on a plea in
abeyance does not constitute an appeal from a final order); State
v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 n.7 (Utah App. 1996) (plea in
abeyance not a final adjudication).
While the trial court determined that the second document, a
certified copy of a Colorado judgment for driving under the
influence, was a valid conviction, it chose to rely on two Utah
convictions as the basis for its ruling that defendant's present
offense should be classified as a third degree felony (R. 134:
13-14).

The court stated:
I'm taking the judgments at face value - as
if the judges had done everything they should
have done to make them valid. And if they're
not valid, the defendant would have the right
to go back and collaterally attack them . . .
and ask that they be set aside or modified.
I think that's the proper procedure.

(Id. at 13).
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The trial court's conclusion that the two Utah judgments
sufficed to render defendant's present offense a felony was
correct.

Here, the State submitted as proof • ::>f the previous
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Here, defendant ignores her burden to produce evidence and
instead merely speculates *~u-a~ •• -^ prngp-'i--T ^a:".^i - -• 55-ate a
f a c t u a 1 b a s i s £ o 1:
convictions.

Br

of App. at 42. 8 Such speculation does :.othmg

8

Defendant also argues that one conviction is ambi-j-,.
because the second page includes a reference to defendant
entering a guilty plea to "DUI to Reckless," omitting any
1£

to rebut the presumption of regularity attaching to the
convictions.

Consequently, defendant's argument must fail.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and
leaving the scene of an accident.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j_f_ day of April, 2001.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

reference to alcohol. See Br. of App. at 42. However, where the
first page unambiguously refers to section 41-6-44(10) and
specifically states, "DUI reduced to Reckless-Alc/Drug Related,"
there is no ambiguity. Defendant's claim is thus frivolous on
its face. See State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 3-- (Utah 1998).
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THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44(10) DUI REDUCED TO RECKLESS-ALC/DRUG RELATED
Plea:
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
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Susp:
0.00
Jail: 60 DA
Susp: 60 DA
ACS:
Charge: 41-12A-302 OPERATING VEHICLE W/O INSURANCE
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 41-6-61 IMPROPER
Plea:
Fine:
0.00
Jail:
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ACS:
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COUNSELING W/PRIVATE PROVIDER FOR ANXIETY AND PROVIDE VERIF OF
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TRACKING:
Fine Stay
Probation
Other

08/28/96
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PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 02/28/96 09:00 AM in rm 2 with JUDITH ATHERTON
DOCKET INFORMATION:
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